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sustainability indicators. EcollOmic instrumems are used to direct environmental policy. 
The economic approach· n;tay be simply stated in a set of propositions. Environmenral 
degradation has an economic ·cost viz., natural capital stock, natural forest, GNP, aesthetic 
damage. Population growth, insecure resource rights, bad central planning, the failure 
of markets to price resources and outputs also reflects social costs. 
Conclusion 
The developing countries should formulate appropriate environmental policy, which 
is crucial for the management of resources. Majority of global environmental damages 
represent the cumulative and contemporary impact of Western industrialization. 
Developing countries have the potential for environmental degradation but ultimat..,ly 
lead to the balance against human survival. The developed world was successful with 
economic growth but the heavily populated developing countries could bring negative 
environmental externalities to the world and then the rich and poor would suffer alike. 
The adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank stabilization policies ensured that 
the cominued poverty of the nations in the South is a necessity for maintaining the 
attained prosperity of the nations in the North. The environmemal imerdependence 
is allowed to developing coumries to get financial assistance to pursue environmenrally 
sustainable development objectives.~ 
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The Climate Change 
and Development Nexus 
Matthew Clarke* 
The rapid economic success achieved by the developing countries in 
general, and India and China in particular; has brought the issue 
of climate change, which is a spin-off of development, to the fore. 
Economic growth is essential for the eradication of poverty and 
generation of wealth. However; it drives energy consumption and 
demand for energy which, in turn, produces toxic gases like carbon 
dioxide (CO). Thus, the price of economic growth is climate change. 
The paradox lies in the foct that when economic growth is the only 
solution to poverty, the resultant climate change (characterized by 
emission of greenhouse gases) also afficts the poor greatly. In this 
context, tt is observed that while traditionally the developed countries 
were charged with polluting the environment globally, now the 
developing countries have overtaken their counterparts as polluters. 
The developing countries have emerged, over the years, as the agents 
responsible for growing pollution in the world, though they are also 
the victims, as most of the poor people belong to the developing 
countries. The author explores the nexus between climate change and 
development in the context of the economic growth of the developing 
countries and its impact on them. 
1. Introduction 
Climate change has, at different times, been discussed either as a scientific 
(IPCe 2001, 2002; Pittock 1998), economic (Nordhaus 1994; Islam et at. 1998; 
World Bank 2000), or ethical (Broome 1992; Mueller 2002; Strauss 2003) issue. As 
the developing countries, especially China and India, continue to achieve high levels 
." . 
of economic growth, climate change must now be considered as a development issue. 
Securing improvements in the standard of living of the world's poor requires increased 
economic growth. But herein lies the paradox of this climate change-developmem 
nexus. Economic growth drives energy demand and consumption. Overwhelmingly, 
this energy is derived from the burning of fossil fuels for both electricity generation 
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and transport, resulting in high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Economic growth 
rherefore increases greenhouse gas emissions. Increased economic growrh is good for 
the poor. Increased greenhouse gas emissions are bad for rhe global community, 
especially the poor. Thus, achieving development will come at the cost of climate 
change. 
Whilst developed countries have been historically responsible for greenhouse gas 
emiSSIOns, developing countries are becoming increasingly responsible for current 
emissions (IPCC 2002; lEA 2004; CDlAC 2004). This is largely a factor of large 
populations, low-level technology, and ongoing industrialization. This is particularly 
the case with China and India. China is the second largest greenhouse gas emitting 
economy in the world-second only to the United States. India is the world's fifth 
largest emitter-emitting more greenhouse gases than Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Canada. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 notes issues with data for greenhouse 
gas emissions in developing countries. The climate change--d.evelopment nexus is 
illustrated by focusing on rhe energy consumption trends of China in Section 3 and 
India in Section 4. Certain policy implications are briefly discussed in Section 5, before 
the paper concludes in Section 6. 
2. Greenhouse Gas Emission Data for Developing Countries 
Despite the importance of developing countries to global emiSSIOns, data is limited. 
The international body charged with the responsibility of coordinating an 
international response to climate change is the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under the UNFCCC, developed 
(Annex 1) countries are required to submit yearly inventories of greenhouse gas 
emissions in a 'common reporting format' in order to assess the progress of abatement 
policies against the Kyoto Protocol commitments (UNFCC 2003). A comparison of 
the data is reasonable and accurate as the methodology is standard across all estimates. 
However, such data does not exist for developing countries, as these countries are 
not required to undertake national greenhouse gas emission inventories in line with 
UNFCCC regulations. 
Third parties have estimated emiSSions data for developing countries. Two 
organizations have comprehensive CO2 emissions estimates for most countries. The first 
is rhe CO, Informational Analysis Center (CD lAC) located wirhin the US Department 
of Energy~ and the second is the International Energy 'Agency (lEA) hxated within 
the OCED. However, merhodologies for estimating CO2 emissions differ between the 
two organizations. It should also be noted that while the estimates of both organizations 
are comprehensive in terms of countries included, estimates are not for the full suite 
of greenhouse gases (only CO2) nor do they consider emissions from sources other than 
the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels. This is significantly less data than is available 
for developed (Annex 1) countries reporting in the "common reporting format". 
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However, as CO
2 
emissions from the consumption and flaring of fossil fuels accounts 
for the largest portion of total greenhouse gas emissions, this data is valid for analysis. 
Finally, the International Energy Agency (lEA) data is available for the period 1980 
to 2002, while the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDlAC) data starts 
at various times (otten as far back as the mid 1800s), but is currently limited to 
2000. While the total estimares between CDlAC and lEA data are toughly 
comparable, no consistent pattern of over or under-estimation exists of carbon dioxide 
(CO,) emissions from the consumption and flaring of fossil-fuels of either dataset. 
Table 1: CDlAC .Rankings 
Ranking Total Fossil Fuel CO, Emissions Per Capita Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions 
Nation Emission Nation Emission (Metric 
(Thousand Tonnes Carbon 
Metric Tonnes Equivalent) 
Carbon 
Equivalent) 
1 USA 1528796 US Virgin Islands 29.91 
2 China 761586 Qatar 19.65 
3 Russian Federation 391664 The Netherland Antilles 12.61 
4 Japan 323281 Bahrain 7.70 
5 India 292265 Guam 7.17 
6 Germany 214386 UAE 6.17 
7 UK 154979 Kuwait 5.97 
8 Canada 118957 Trinidad and Tobago 5.58 
9 Italy 116859 USA 540 
10 Republic of Korea 116543 Luxembourg 531 
11 Mexico 115713 Falkland Islands 5.24 
12 Saudi Arabia 102168 Aruba 5.20 
13 France 98917 Brunei 508 
14 Australia 94094 Wake Island 4.91 
15 Ukraine 93551 j\ustralia 4.77 
16 South Africa 89323 Saudi Arabia 3.90 
17 Iran 84689 Singapore 3.87 
18 Brazil 83930 Canada 384 
19 Poland 82245 Faeroe Islands 3.84 I 
20 Spain I 77220 Palau 3.48 
China 0.60 
India 0.29 
Source: CDJAC 2004. 
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3. China's Energy Demand and Energy Consumption 
Since the economic liberalization in 1979, China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
has "incteased neatly seven-fold. Yet, despite this enormous increase, China is still a 
developing country withGDP per capita of only 15%of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. China is aiming ro quadruple its 
GDP over rhenext two decades and increase the urbanization rate from 35% to 65% 
(a more comervative estimate of 50% would still reslIlt in 700 rniHiQn people living 
in urban centres with .greater energy consumption than their rural cou.nterparrs). If 
these targets are achieved, China will reach GDP per capita levels of a middl~-income 
country in only a few decades. Such economic development will place great s€resson 
the environment, particularly through the emissiom of greenhouse gases, rising 
between 70% to 130% (Dadi and Levine, 2003). 
China is the world's second largest emitter of CO2, China's heavy energy needs are 
driven by its population growth and its economic development. It presently emits nearly 
14% of the world's total CO2 emissions up from 80% in 1980 (lEA, 2002a). Given 
the current demand for energy, propelled by economic growth, it is likely that this share 
will increase sharply in the future. Chiaa's total CO2 emissions have grown in line with 
its energy consumption over the past rwodecades. Since 1971, CO, emissions in China 
have increased three-fold, predominantly due to its reliance on dirty -coal and other fossil 
fuel combustion to produce enough energy to meet spiraling demand. China's reponed 
CO2 emissions peaked in 1996 but have remained stable since then 
Table 2: CDIAC and lEA Estimates of CO2 Emissions 
(In thousands of carbon equivalent metric tonnes---except per capita) 
CDIAC Estimates of CDIAC Per lEA Estimates of lEA Per Capita 
Year Total Fossil Fuel CO, Ca:pitaCO, Total Fossil Fuel CO, Emissions 
Emissions Emissions Rates CO, Emissions Rates 
1990 654710 0.57 616891 0.53 
1991 687542 0.59 645779 0.55 
1992 721323 0.61 667897 0.56 
1993 760462 0.64 711856 0.60 
1994 807334 0.67 768007 0.64 
1995 872721 0.72 787716 0.65 
1996 912318 0.14 803146 0.65 
1997 898820 0.72 824279 0.66 
1998 850695 0.68 805182 0.64 
1999 771022 0.61 794548 0.63 
2000 761586 0.60 822848 0.65 
2001 - - 866114 0.67 
2002 - - 90611 0 0.70 
Source: CDlAC 2004; lEA 2004. 
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According to the CDIAC (2004) estimates, CO2 emissIOns from fossil fuels fell 
16.2%, from 912 million metric tonnes of carbon to 762 million metric tonnes 
between 1996 and 2000. Despite this recent decline, China's emissions have increased 
steadily since 1950. Between 1970-1996, emissio·ns grew at 5.6% per annum. Due 
to China's large population (approaching 1.3 billion people), per capita emission rates 
(0.60 metric tonnes of carbon in 2000) are well below the global average. The estimates 
of CO
2 
emissions by the lEA (2004) are higher than CDIAC estimates. According 
to this data, 'China increased its CO2 emissions by 32% between 1990-2002, from 
616,891 to 906,110 thousand metric tonnes carbon equivalent. Over three-quarters 
of these emissions resulted from coal consumption. Within the lEA dataset, China's 
per capita emission rate was 0.70 metric tonnes of carbon equivalent, an increase of 
nearly 24% between 1990-2002. 
3.1 Explaining China's Energy Production and Consumption 
China's industrial sector accounts for 75% of all energy-related CO2 emISSIOns. 
The commercial sector accounts for 11%, the transport sector 9% and the residential 
sector 5%. It is expected that the transport sector will increasingly contribute to 
greenhouse emissions as China continues to develop. Mobility has increased as a result 
of car affordability improving for large sections of the population in conjunction with 
an easing of internal travel restrictions. Therefore, CO2 emissions ftom the road 
transport sector increased 125% and other transport increased 46% between 
1990-2000 (CDIAC 2004). 
In terms of global primary energy consumption, China accounted for nearly 70% 
of the global increase between 2001 and 2002 (see Table 3). China's primary energy 
production increased 19.7% between 2001 and 2002 compared to an increase of 0.6% 
in OECD countries and 2.6% for the entire world (BP 2003). 
China became self-sufficient in oil during the mid-1960s and an oil exponer in 
the mid-1980s. By 1993, China's domestic energy demand resulted in evolving it as 
a net importer. Just seven years later, China was the world's sixth largest importer, 
behind the US, Japan, Germany, France and Italy. China is now the world's second 
largest oil consumer. The increase in world oil consumption was only 0.1 % between 
2001-2002, yet China's oil consumption increased by 5.8% (BP 2003). It is forecast 
that by 2030, China will import 600 million wnnes of oil (a figure comparable with 
the US today). 
China also accountS for one quarter of the total world consumption of coal. China's 
coal consumption increased by 27.9% between 2001-2002, compared to the rest of the 
world (excluding China) of 6.9%. In 2003, domestic coal production rose by 100 million 
tonnes. In 1998, coal accounted for 62% of primaty energy use, increasing to 70% in 
2002. Even the most optimistic and sustainable-focused scenario still, coal will be 
responsible for at least 55% of energy production in 2020 (Dadi and Levine 2003). The 
coal used is dirty and a primary source of China's CO2 emissions. Officially, coal use 
for energy reached the peak in 1996 but declined by nearly 25% by 1999. Ftom 1996, 
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inefficient small coal pits were closed by government order and over 57,000 mines 
were officially closed down by 2001 reducing coal production by 350 million wnnes 
(Stinton and Fridley, 2002). 
3.2 Things Could be Worse 
Reductions in population growth have reduced China's potential emission output by 
150 million wnnes per year (Pew 2002). By developing various population policies, 
it is estimated that 300 million less births occurred over the past three decades. Forest 
cover in China has increased from 13% w 17% since 1986. The importance of forest 
cover is that it acts as a carbon sink. It is estimated that more than 123 million wnnes 
'of carbon dioxide (CO,) have been absorbed by afforestation over the last 50 years 
(Pew 2002). Another 100 million wnnes of emissions have been reduced through 
reduced energy intensil)'. Energy intensil)' fell by 2.9% per annum over the last fout 
decades, well ahead of that experienced in developed countries (Xue and Sheehan, 2003). 
This reduction is particularly significant as most countries at China's stage of 
development have steady or rising energy intensities. Chinas energy efficiency is largely 
a result of the liberalization program implemented in 1979, including, structural 
adjustment, tax reform, fewer subsidies for state-owned enterprises and price 
deregulation. 
3.3 Things Could be Much Worse-Inaccurate Data 
Emission data estimates by both lEA and CDIAC are based on data prepared by 
national governments. Official Chinese figures show that coal consumption actually 
fell by one-third between 1997 and 2000 and rose 46% between 2000 and 2002 
(BP 2003-see Table 3). Such fluctuations cast serious doubts over the accuracy of 
these statistics. Indeed, claims that China has dramatically reduced coal consumption 
and greenhouse gas emissions are beginning to be questioned (Zittel and Treber, 2003; 
Stinton 2001; Stinton and Fridley 2002, 2003). It would be of great importance if 
these official figures had been systematically understated and misreported for some 
time. If these government figures are understated, then so too are the estimated CO, 
emissions. This raises doubts that emission growth has reduced over the past thre~ 
Table 4: Comparisons of Chinas Intensity Changes 
Emissions Intensity Change in Intensity Change in Rate of Change 
(tons of Co/$m (% 'per annum) (% per annum) 
GDP) 1999 1960-80 1980-99 1960-80 and 1980-99 
Hong Kong 67.7 -1.0 -0.2 0.8 
UK 114.3 -2.2 -2.8 -0.6 
USA 171.0 -1.6 -2.2 -0.6 
Australia 195.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.8 
China (Mainland) 180.6 -1.0 -39 -2.9 
Source: Xue and Sheehan (2003). 
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decades by an estimated 250 million ronnes of carbon per year, about one-third of 
China's current emissions. 
If under-reporting of coal consumption did occur, it is possible to adjust coal 
consumption figures from 1997 in order ro estimate what the real consumption figures 
may be and then re-.estimate CO2 emissions (CSES 2005). Three sets of adjustments 
are made: 1) Low; 2) Mid-range; and 3) High range. The low estimate is based on 
an average increase of around 5% per annum. This roughly reflects the increase reported 
between 1992 and 1996. The mid-range estimate is based on average increases of 7.8% 
per annum. This figure reflects recent growth in GDp, which is a primary driver of 
energy demand. The high-range figure is based on average increases of 14% per annum. 
This figure is half of the increase in official coal consumption reported between 
2001-2002. Given the large fluctuations in reported coal consumption, it is likely that 
the true figure lies between the mid and high-range estimates. 
The difference between the reported coal consumption and the projected estimates 
is quite significant (see Table 5 and Figure 1). At the most extreme, the estimated 
high-range in 2002 is 2.25 times greater than the reported figure. 
An important figure in relation ro climate change is the cumulative consumption 
of coal over this period. Between 1992-2002, 6499 million ronnes of oil equivalent 
(mroe) were consumed officially. This compares ro 7983 mroe, 8843 mtoe and 9712 
mtoe, respectively for the low, mid and high range estimates. In terms of rotal coal 
consumed for this II-year peTiod, the estimates range up ro 50%. This difference will 
have a significant impact on climate change analysis. 
Table 5: Coal Consumption Estimates 
Coal Consumption (toe*) 
BP 2003 Low Mid High (5% p.a.) (7.8% p.a.) (14% p.a.) 
1992 549.5 549.5 549.5 549.5 
1993 570.3 570.3 570.3 570.3 
1994 606.4 606.4 606.4 606.4 
1995 681.7 681.7 681.7 681.7 
1996 681.6 681.6 681.6 681.6 
1997 681.7 725.7 734.8 7770 
1998 608.3 762.3 792.1 885.8 
1999 492.3 798.8 853.9 1009.8 
2000 454.7 835.4 920.5 1151.2 
2001 518.7 872.0 992.3 1312.4 
2002 663.4 908.6 1069.7 1496.1 
Cumulative Total 6498.8 7982.5 8443.0 9712.0 
* roe = ronnes of oil equivalent. 
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Figure 1: Trajectories of Coal Consumption Estimates 
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Table 6: CO2 Emission Estimates 
Coal Consumption (toe*) 
BP 2003 Low Mid High (5% pal (7.8% pal (14% pal 
1992 2103.5 2103.5 21 03.5 2103.5 
1993 2183.1 2183.1 2183.1 2183.1 
1994 2321.3 2321.3 2321.3 2321.3 
1995 2572.0 2572.0 25720 2572.0 
1996 2609.2 2609.2 2609.2 2609.2 
1997 2328.6 27779 2812.7 29744 
1998 2328.6 29179 3032.1 3390.9 
1999 1884.5 3058.0 3268.6 3865.6 
2000 1740.6 3198.0 3523.5 4406.8 I 
2001 1985.6 3338.0 37984 5023.7 
2002 2539.5 34780 4094.6 57271 
Cumulative Total 24877.4 30556.9 32319.0 371776 
* roe = tonnes of oil equivalent. 
It is possible ro estimate CO, emIssions from developing countries by applying 
emissions factors ro the consumption of oil, gas and coal. The estimation is based on 
converting coal consumed from mtoe to MWh using a conversion factor of 11.6 and 
then estimating CO, emissions by using an emission factor suggested by the IPCC 
(2002) of 330 g CO/kWh. Whilst a rough estimate, this LEST method is reasonably 
accurate (Zittel and Treber, 2003). 
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The different estimates present a large difference in the likely emiSSIOns emitted 
through coal consumption for this period. The estimates range from 24877 (Mt) of 
CO2 emissions to 37177 (Mt). This difference will impact on climate change. 
4. India's Energy Development and Energy Consumption 
Two estimates of India's greenhouse gas emissions using the UNFCCC common format 
have been undertaken. The first was for the base year 1990 and was estimated by the 
National Physical Laboratory as part of the Asia Least-Cost Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Program. The second was undertaken by the Ministry of Energy and Forests for the 
year 1994. While broad comparisons between these two inventories are possible, 
analysis is limited due ro there being only two estimates (which are now quite dated). 
Therefore, the data that is estimated by lEA and CDlAC is preferred for this analysis. 
In 2000, India was the world's fifth highest CO2 emitting country (CD lAC 2004). 
However, India's large population (now over 1 billion people) has resulted in CO2 
per capita emissions rate being well below the global average at only 0.29 metric tonnes. 
Average annual growth in fossil fuels CO2 emissions since 1950 has been just under 6%, 
with total emissions rising by nearly 60% since 1990. India is the world's third largest 
producer of coal and coal consumption is the major source of CO2 emissions. In 2000, 
nearly three-quarters of fossil fuel emissions came from coal consumption (down from 
87% in 1950). Oil consumption accounts for nearly 20% of CO2 emissions. 
Table 7: CDlAC and lEA Estimates of CO2 Emissions 
(in thousands of carbon equivalent metric tonnes---except per capita) 
CDIAC Estimates of CDIAC lEA Estimates of lEA Per Capita 
Year Total Fossil Fuel CO, Per Capita CO2 Total Fossil Fuel CO, Emissions 
Emissions Emissions Rates CO, Emissions Rates 
1990 184296 0.22 161801 0.19 
1991 197516 0.23 169778 0.20 
1992 211336 0.24 180201 0.20 
1993 220346 0.25 189593 0.21 
1994 234778 0.26 200172 0.22 
1995 247689 0.27 236477 0.25 
1996 273682 0.29 226329 0.24 
1997 279873 0.29 238219 0.25 
1998 289269 0.30 245034 0.25 
1999 293938 0.30 254717 0.25 
2000 292265 0.29 271665 0.27 
2001 
- - 275491 0.27 
2002 -
- 279871 0.27 
Source: CDIAC 2004; lEA 20M. 
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According to the CDlAC (2004) estimates, CO, emissions from fossil fuels increased 
nearly 60% from 184 million metric tonnes of c-;'rbon to 292 million metric tonnes 
between 1990-2000. Due to India's large population, per capita emissions rates (0.29 
metric tonnes of carbon in 2000) are amongst the lowest in the world. The estimates 
of CO
2 
emissions by the lEA (2004) are lower than CDlAC estimates. According to 
this data, India increased its CO2 emissions by 73% between 1990 to 2002, from 
161 million metric tonnes to 279 million metric tonnes of carbon equivalent. Nearly, 
70% of these emissions resulted from coal consumption. Within the lEA dataset, India's 
CO
2 
emissions per capita rate in 2002 was 0.27 metric tonnes carbon equivalent. 
4.1 Explaining India's Energy Production and Consumption 
India is the ~orld's second most populous country and despite having a large portion 
of its population (around one-third) living below the poverry line, it is the world's 
fourth largest economy. 
During the 1990s, India's economy grew on average, just over 6.5% per annum, 
almost doubling in size within this period. However, energy use grew slightly faster 
at 7% per annum and demand for electricity grew at 8% per annum. Despite this 
growth, India's per capita electricity use is one-half of China's and one-sixth of the 
world's average. This is primarily a factor of over 400 million people lacking access 
to electricity (lEA, 2002). India's carbon emissions have increased by 63% since 1990. 
"This emissions growth results primarily from energy use associated with economic 
development and heavy dependence on coal" (Pew 2002, p. 22). 
India's industrial development has been fueled by energy derived from coal. Thus, 
India's growth has come at a high price-domestically this equates to worsening alf 
pollution, and globally this equates to increased greenhouse gas emissions. Another 
significant greenhouse gas in India is Methane from rice paddies and ruminating cows. 
Coal accounts for 55% of primary energy use, oil accounts for 3%, gas accounts 
for 8%, hydro for 5% and nuclear for 1 %. The industrial sector produces around 
two-thirds of all energy-related CO
2 
emissions. The transport sector produces 16%, 
the residential seCtor produces 14% and the commercial sector 3% (Pew 2002). 
Between 1992-2002, India's oil consumption increased from 62.1 million tonnes 
to 97.7 million tonnes. This increase of 58% is far greater than the increase in world 
consumption for the same time, which was only 11 %. Coal consumption in India 
increased by 40% from 123.3 mtoe to 180.8 mtoe, compared ro the worldwide increase 
of only 8% for the same period. Primary energy consumption increased 50% from 
216.4 mtoe to 325.1 mtoe compared ro the increase in world consumprion levels of 
15% (see Table 8). 
A business-as-usual scenario, which assumed sustained economic growth and 
continued dependence on domestic coal resources for energy production, resulted in 
energy-related carbons of 668 million tonnes in 2030 (Pew, 2002). This is three times 
the current level. 
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4.2 Things Could be Worse 
Over the last decade, India's growth in energy-related CO
2 
emissions has been reduced 
through economic restructuring, enforcement of existing dean air laws, and renewable 
energy programs (Pew, 2002). 
The adoption of new and efficient technologies and the expansion of non-energy 
intensive industries have resulted in the gradual decline of industrial energy intensity 
over the past decade. However, the Indian industry is still highly energy intensive whel< 
compared to the rest of the world. 
Biomass accounts for nearly one-third of the total energy use. This should nOt be 
surprising, as over 440 million people in India do not have access to electricity. Biomass 
is used for cooking energy needs for nearly all rural households and nearly half of urban 
households (Shuckle, 1996). 
India's fuel quality; technology standards, infrastructure and operating practices was 
improved over the past decade through market reform driven by domestic policy and 
international dynamics (Pew 2002). Power and liquid fuel pricing now occurs within 
the market place rather than being centrally planned as in the past. Some subsidies 
still exist, for example, LPG for household cooking, but nearly two-thirds of current 
prices cover the actual cost of supplying energy. 
The coal sector is being successfully restructured through a combination of 
privatization, price reform and technological improvements. The Indian coal price is 
now near world price as the subsidies have been removed. Therefore, there is not a 
false demand leading to higher carbon emissions. Technology has improved stoves, 
reduced gas flaring in fossil-fuel production, improved both demand and supply-side 
efficiencies and introduced modern renewable energy systems. These technology 
advances equate to 18 million less tonnes of carbon emissions each year (Pew, 2002). 
India's motor vehicle stock has also changed considerably over the past decade. There 
has been a rapid penetration of foreign brands and European emissions standards have 
now been adopted in the major cities of India. Such standards have improved local 
air qualiry but also resulted in more energy efficient cars. This has led to reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions (Mashekler et al. 2002). 
"The Indian e1ectriciry sector has long been carbon intensive and the largest sourc·e 
of CO2 emissions. In 2000, the sector emitted 115 million tonnes of carbon, about 
42% of India's carbon emissions. Natural gas has penetrated this market in recent 
years and helped to reduce the carbon intensiry of electric power generation. 
Improvement in the combustion efficiency of conventional coal technologies along 
with strong promotion of renewable technologies has made measurable contributions 
to mitigation. Improved combustion in coal-fired power plants slowed the growth 
of carbon emissions by 2.5 million tonnes between 1990 and 2000. The Indian 
government has set a goal of using renewables for 10% of new power generating 
capaciry by 20lO" (Pew, 2002, p. 24). 
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Over the past 20 years, India has developed a large renewable ener:gy proo:ram. 
3 million small biomass gasification systems have been built to fuel co~king 
a large percentage of rural households. The efficiency of wood stoves has been 
in 34 million homes directly leading to reduced levels of deforestation. 
vernment subsidies have made some solar power technologies available and similar 
support the installation of wind, small hydro, biomass and industrial 
e1ectriciry generation technologies (Pew, 2002). Given the huge 
domestic market in India, the small and successful introduction of these renewable 
technologies bodes well for future use. 
Deforestation rates in India are amongst the lowest in the developing world. "Forest 
measures include prohibiting the use of forest land for non-forestry 
purposes, encouraging agroforestry and private plantations to meet industrial wood 
needs, and expanding areas under protection" (Pew, 2002, p. 26). Since 1990, over 
14 million hectares of forest were protected by such programs. 
5. Policy Implications of the Climate Change-Development Nexus 
The international communiry must now consider development and climate change as 
a single issue to determine a new approach. Climate change is a function of greenhouse 
gas emission concentrations. The IPCC (2002) have estimated that increases in CO, 
concentrations from pre-industrial level based on various scenarios of future energy use 
may lead to an increase in global temperatures of between 1.4°C and 5.8°C. It is also 
possible to estimate the level of greenhouse gas emissions that will result in these various 
increases in CO
2 
concentrations. Capping emissions with these limits in mind must 
now also be considered an urgent policy initiative in post-Kyoto negotiations. So whilst 
it is immoral to suggest that economic growth in developing countries be slowed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, CO
2 
emissions increased 80% in the Asia and Oceania 
region between 1980 and 2002 (lEA, 2004). This compares to an increase for the 
same period of just 3% for Western Europe. Future projections suggest these trend 
will continue (CSES, 2005). Therefore, a focus on curbing emissions in some manner 
in developing countries is required. 
Countries must act both individually and in coalition with the international 
communiry to address climate change. Many developing countries, including China 
and India, have begun domestic actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but have 
been largely excluded from international efforts (such as the Kyoto Protocol) to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
The growing influence of developing countries on global emlSSlOns is well known. 
Both Australia and the United States used the omission of developing countries from 
the Kyoto Protocol as a major reason' for not ratifYing it. More recently, on 
July 26, 2005 a new multilateral climate change compact was announced. This new 
compact is an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol. It includes the United States, Australia, 
South Korea, Japan, China and India. These countries account for around half of the 
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